Nondoxastic Attitudes and Religious Propositions by Marsh, Andrew Charles
 
 
Nondoxastic Attitudes and Religious Propositions 
By 
Copyright 2011 
Andrew Charles Marsh 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Arts. 
 
 
________________________________        
    Chairperson Scott Jenkins             
 
 
________________________________        
Teresa Robertson 
 
 
________________________________        
Jim Woelfel 
 
 
 
Date Defended: June 6
th
, 2011 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
The Thesis Committee for Andrew Charles Marsh 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 
 
Nondoxastic Attitudes and Religious Propositions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
 Chairperson Scott Jenkins 
 
 
       
Date approved: June 6
th
, 2011 
 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
 
 Doxastic (from the Greek work doxa, meaning belief) attitudes are those 
propositional attitudes that are equivalent to, or entail, belief.  Discussions of faith, 
particularly its rationality, generally presume that it is doxastic.  There are, however, 
numerous nondoxastic attitudes; why presume that faith is doxastic?  Instead of belief, 
can faith be analyzed in terms of nondoxastic attitudes?  Does faith that God exists 
always entail a belief that God exists?   
 Hope is one example of a nondoxastic attitude.  If one has hope that God exists, 
does that mean that one has faith that God exists?  Acceptance is another nondoxastic 
attitude.  Is accepting the tenets of a religion sufficient to make one a person of faith?  It 
has also been suggested that the attitude of faith is a distinct, irreducible, nondoxastic 
attitude.  What implications does this approach to faith have for the evaluation of faith? 
  In what follows, it will be argued that faith can be analyzed in terms of 
nondoxastic attitudes; faith that God exists need not entail a belief that God exists.  All 
three of the aforementioned nondoxastic attitudes (acceptance, hope, and faith) are viable 
approaches to faith.  Furthermore, it will be argued that a distinct nondoxastic approach 
to faith (fiducial faith) is preferable for its benefits.  These include, an important 
volitional component, important differences in its grounds for rationality, and recognition 
of an attitudinal component in faith.   
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Introduction 
 Discussions on faith, particularly its rationality, typically take it for granted that it 
is a doxastic attitude.  There are, however, numerous nondoxastic attitudes that agents are 
capable of possessing.  Hope is one example.  One question we ought to ask then is 
whether or not faith should be evaluated in terms of belief.  Or, is it possible that faith 
that God exists can be understood in terms of hope, or some other nondoxastic attitude, 
that God exists? 
 The question is motivated by several considerations.  For one, faith (like trust, as I 
will argue) is a pervasive attitude.  Not just faith in religious propositions, either: 
individuals have faith in each other, faith in the government, and faith in themselves.  So 
one consideration is a question about how such ―faith‖ should be understood and 
evaluated.  
 Another motivation is a question about the rationality of faith.  If faith is 
presumed to be doxastic, then the rationality of faith is in large measure a question of the 
rationality of its belief component.  However, if faith is understood as a nondoxastic 
attitude, then evaluations of its rationality will become more nuanced, and furthermore, 
faith may very well be rational even if the corresponding belief is not.  For instance, 
might it be rational to have faith that a friend‘s cancer will go into remission, even if it is 
irrational to believe that?     
 I begin with an examination of the attitude of acceptance.  This attitude has been 
brought to light in the writings of William Alston and L. Jonathan Cohen.  The next 
attitude I turn to is that of hope.  I will look primarily at the work of Louis Pojman.  The 
final attitude I will consider is faith itself, considered as a distinct, irreducible, 
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nondoxastic attitude.  Robert Audi has written extensively on this idea and will be the 
primary source for its discussion.  
 I want to begin, however, with a brief clarification of some of the language I will 
employ, lest there be any confusion.  First, ―attitude‖ will always be short for 
―propositional attitude.‖  A propositional attitude is, simply enough, the particular 
attitude a subject has towards a proposition.  These attitudes may range from belief, hope, 
fear, doubt, wonder, or faith, etc..  Second, doxastic (from the Greek work doxa, meaning 
belief) attitudes are those attitudes that entail belief.  A non-doxastic attitude, by contrast, 
is one that does not entail belief.  So, for instance, if I have a nondoxastic attitude towards 
the proposition that leopards are fast, then my attitude does not entail that I have a belief 
that leopards are fast.  Finally, a cognitive attitude is one where the object of the attitude 
is a proposition: a statement capable of being true or false.  I will take it for granted that 
the attitudes I consider, particularly faith, are cognitive.
1
 
                                                 
1
 For an example of a view that is non-cognitivist, see J.S. Clegg‘s ―Faith‖ (1979) where he 
writes, ―genuine avowals of faith reveal states of mind.  They are most accurately read as 
symptomatic displays that may be judged as sincere or insincere, but not as true or false‖ (p229). 
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Chapter One: Acceptance  
 William Alston offers the first candidate for the type of nondoxastic faith that I 
want to consider.  Alston‘s work focuses on the propositional attitude of acceptance.  He 
contends that acceptance is a nondoxastic attitude and largely neglected in discussions of 
faith.  Nevertheless,
 
acceptance is a positive
2
 attitude, like belief, and it will be shown 
that it resembles belief in many ways.  I begin with a description of acceptance, as well as 
the relevant distinctions between belief and acceptance.  One of the central claims made 
therein is that beliefs are, by and large, involuntary; I will look at this claim next.  Finally 
I will look at several problems for Alston‘s view.   
1.1 An Analysis 
 Alston believes there is an important difference between acceptance and belief 
that is often overlooked.  For instance, suppose that you and I are jurors for an important 
trial.  During deliberations you tell me that you ―accept‖ that what the drug dealer 
testified was true.  Are you telling me that you believe the drug dealer‘s testimony, or 
something else?  To explain just what that ―something else‖ might be, I‘ll start by 
describing belief and the two important ways Alston thinks acceptance differs from it.   
 First, Alston thinks of beliefs as dispositional states.
3
  What sort of disposition?  It 
                                                 
2
 ―Positive‖ here can mean many things.  To complicate matters, the various authors I will cite 
often use it differently.  It might mean an affirmative or ―positive‖ attitude, one that is contrasted 
with ―negative‖ attitudes (e.g. doubt, disbelief, etc.).  Or, it can mean descriptive, when 
discussing positive vs. normative statements.  I think it is the former that Alston intends.  It can 
also mean, in a more literal sense, something good (which is how Audi will use it in discussing 
the ―positive‖ attitudinal component to faith). 
3
 Philosophers tend to make a distinction between occurrent beliefs, or beliefs currently being 
considered by the mind, and dispositional beliefs, or beliefs that are stored in the mind but not 
currently under consideration.  Alston‘s talk of dispositions should not be confused with the 
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is a disposition to do or think various things under specific conditions.  For instance, the 
following conditional is true of belief: (1) ―if S believes that p, then if someone asks S 
whether p, S will have a tendency to respond in the affirmative.‖
4
  So too is (2), ―if S 
believes that p, then if S considers whether it is the case that p, S will tend to feel it to be 
the case that p, with one or another degree of confidence.‖
5
  Alston offers several other 
conditionals (i.e. dispositions to do x) to characterize the state of belief.  Notice that in 
each conditional the consequent is a tendency: a belief is a disposition, but often times 
there are contravening influences in the lives of individuals.  Alston lists six such 
conditionals, but is open to the possibility that more or less might capture the concept of 
belief. 
 Alston, following L. J. Cohen,
6
 thinks that the second conditional (―if S believes 
that p, then if S considers whether it is the case that p, S will tend to feel it to be the case 
that p, with one or another degree of confidence‖) is particularly adept at describing 
belief.  Of chief importance in the second conditional is the use of the word ―feels‖ in the 
consequent.  It would be easy, and mistaken, for one to assume that Alston is here 
equating belief with an emotion.  The word is actually meant to highlight the fact that the 
role of consciousness, in belief, is largely passive.  I typically do not decide to be angry, 
downcast, happy, or joyful.  Likewise, I typically do not decide what I will believe.  
                                                                                                                                                 
latter.  However, a disposition nicely captures the distinction, since dispositions are ―something 
that one can have in a latent state as well as in an active state‖ (Alston, 1996, p4). 
4
 Alston, William, 1996. ―Belief, acceptance, and religious faith,‖ in J. Jordan and D. Howard-
Snyder (eds), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, London: Rowman 
& Littlefield, p3. 
5
 Alston, 1996, p3 
6
 L. Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
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Instead, I find myself confronted or ―struck by‖ the way things are.
7
  For example, I open 
my blinds and am confronted with the fact that it is snowing, forming the belief that it is 
snowing.  Or, I open my window and am struck by the sound of birds, forming the belief 
that there are birds outside my window.  There is no belief-forming activity on my part to 
acquire these beliefs.   
 With this understanding of belief in mind, we can look at an important difference 
between acceptance and belief.  While beliefs are dispositional states, acceptance 
involves a mental act.  When you accept the witnesses‘ testimony, you perform some 
mental activity to bring about the positive attitude of acceptance.  That mental activity is 
the adoption of ―a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p—i.e., of including 
that proposition … among one‘s premises for deciding what to do or think in a particular 
context.‖
8
  So when you accept the testimony as true you include it among those other 
propositions relevant to determining a verdict in the trial.  You take on, or adopt, that 
proposition among other attitudes (such as belief, etc.) you possess.  It seems to me that 
the contrast here between belief and acceptance is summed up nicely in terms of the 
aforementioned active/passive distinction: the mind is largely passive in belief formation, 
but the mind is active in accepting. 
  While acceptance involves some mental activity on my part, it does bring about a 
certain dispositional state.  The reason it must do so is that it would be of little 
consequence otherwise.  If I accepted a proposition only to the extent that I performed the 
relevant act, then as soon as I ceased said activity I would no longer accept the 
                                                 
7
 Bearing in mind: if I believe ―that the Labrador Duck is extinct,‖ then I take it to be the case that 
the Labrador Duck is extinct.   This is how things supposedly are; my belief represents what I 
take to be the case. 
8
 Cohen, 1994, p4. 
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proposition.  If the act left behind no residue, no imprint in the cognitive framework, then 
we could only accept things to the extent that we dwelled on them.  This seems to be 
incorrect because, months after the trial, you may still accept the dubious testimony; 
furthermore, you may feel that you‘ve accepted it all this time, even when it was farthest 
from your mind.  The reason this is possible is because the act of acceptance produces a 
dispositional state similar to belief. 
 It is important to clarify just what that dispositional state is, in order to keep the 
distinction between belief and acceptance
9
 clear (indeed, a major criticism of Alston‘s 
view is that it amounts to nothing more than belief).  Alston describes the attitude as 
similar to belief in that many of the aforementioned conditionals apply to acceptance as 
well.  So, the first conditional would be true of acceptance: ―if S [accepts] p, then if 
someone asks S whether p, S will have a tendency to respond in the affirmative.‖  The 
chief difference between the two is that the second conditional (―if S [accepts] that p, 
then if S considers whether it is the case that p, S will tend to feel it to be the case that p, 
with one or another degree of confidence‖), which Alston describes as particularly true of 
belief, is not true of acceptance.  This also serves to highlight why acceptance is a 
nondoxastic attitude; one may accept something without believing it.  Other than 
describing the acceptance-disposition in terms of a ―policy‖ (as in the Cohen quote 
above) or a type of ―guiding-principle,‖ not much more can be said for it.  Alston does 
write in a later work that ―when we come to say just what positive attitude to a 
                                                 
9
 Alston admits that it might be infelicitous to have the term ―acceptance‖ range over both the act 
and the engendered disposition.  The term ―acceptance‖ is meant to capture the adoption of the 
policy, not the having of the policy or the acting upon the policy.   However, when it comes to 
religious propositions, the ―having‖ and ―acting‖ are equally important (if not more so), so for 
simplicity sake he uses the term for both. 
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proposition is adopted when one accepts it, we are back to the pervasive similarity of 
acceptance and belief,‖ but that ―accepting that p is both a complex dispositional state 
markedly similar to believing that p, but distinguished from it by the fact that it issues 
from … a mental act that is voluntarily engaged in.‖
10
  This leads me to the second 
contrast with belief. 
 Beliefs are, by and large, involuntary.  It is not the case that I can consider some 
proposition and, by an act of will, come to believe that proposition.  Instead, I typically 
find myself to have beliefs, not choose them.  Suppose I look out the window and see that 
it is snowing.  I do not will myself to form the belief that it is snowing.  Rather, I see that 
it is snowing, and upon reflection (or upon being asked) I admit that I believe it is 
snowing.  This raises an important point though.  I cannot directly will myself to have 
certain beliefs, but I do have indirect control over what I believe.  In the case of the snow, 
I have the power to either look outside the window or not.  If I never look outside I may 
not form the belief that it is snowing.  Or consider another example: suppose I want to 
believe that the Loch Ness monster exists.  I cannot form this belief by sheer will alone.
11
  
However, perhaps if I watch the right documentaries, read the right interviews, and talk 
to the right people, I can come to believe that the Loch Ness monster exists.  I will return 
to this question of doxastic voluntarism (i.e. the thesis that we can believe things at will) 
later in the paper. 
 Unlike belief, acceptance is voluntary in the direct sense.  We can directly will 
ourselves to accept things.  For instance, I could accept that the Loch Ness monster 
                                                 
10
 Alston, William, 2007. ―Audi on Nondoxastic Faith.‖ In M. Timmons, J. Greco, and A. Mele 
(eds), Rationality and the Good, New York: Oxford University Press. p132. 
11
 As proof, it is often asked whether or not one could willingly form the belief that Santa existed, 
if one was offered a million dollars to do so.   
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existed, even if I could not will myself to believe it.  The reason is that all it is to accept 
that the monster exists is to include that proposition (i.e. that the Loch Ness monster 
exists) among others I utilize in thinking and acting.  So, if I am considering whether or 
not to join an expedition in search of the creature, I might accept that it exists prior to 
pursuing it.   
 While acceptance is voluntary, it is not the case that just any proposition can be 
accepted.  We cannot accept propositions that are contrary to what we hold to be true or 
take to be true.
12
  I cannot accept both p and not-p; nor can I accept p when I believe not-
p.  So, for example, if I believe there are no undiscovered/unclassified megafauna still in 
existence, then I cannot accept that an unclassified megafauna (i.e. the Loch Ness 
monster) still exists.  The reason no agent, no self-reflecting agent anyway, can accept p 
under these conditions is that to accept p is to take it be true.  One cannot take both p and 
not-p to be true, after reflection.  It is only possible for one of them to be true. 
 We do, however, ―take‖ things to be true, despite believing the contrary.  For 
instance, I might assume something to be true, despite believing it to be false.  Similarly, 
I might adopt a working hypothesis, to see what followed from it, even if I felt it to be 
false.  In both cases my attitude might coexist with other, contrary attitudes.  The 
difference between acceptance and an assumption or hypothesis is important though.  
Alston writes, ―The sense of ‗accept‘ with which I am concerned, is different from 
                                                 
12
 John Bishop stresses a distinction between holding something to be true (belief) and taking 
something to be true (practical belief).  Beliefs, under Bishop‘s view, are dispositions to take as 
true in practical reasoning what we hold to be true.  On Bishop‘s view, we do not always take to 
be true those things that we hold to be true.  I think this distinction, despite the language of 
practical ―belief,‖ helps make sense of Alston‘s view.  See Bishop, John, 2007.  Believing by 
Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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adopting a ―working assumption‖ in the sense of proceeding as if it were true, in contrast 
to taking it to be true.  Acceptance in my sense is the latter.‖
13
  So, while I might assume 
or hypothesize that a particular particle existed, despite believing it did not, I could not 
accept that it existed.  Acceptance is the more positive attitude. 
 Here are two examples, suggested by Alston, which may help to flesh out the 
concept of acceptance.  They are both examples where someone accepts something but, 
purportedly, does not unqualifiedly believe it.  First, a defensive coordinator for a football 
team may accept that the opposing quarterback is going to throw the ball on the next 
play, without actually believing it.  The coordinator has some evidence for this, given the 
quarterback‘s history, but the coordinator lacks enough evidence to believe this.  The 
coordinator could also accept that the quarterback is going to hand the ball off, but he 
could not accept that the quarterback was going to perform a song and dance number.
14
  
In accepting that the quarterback will throw the ball on the next play, he includes this fact 
with others he utilizes (e.g. his beliefs about the line of scrimmage and the down) to make 
a decision about which play to call.   
 Second, imagine a general who is deploying his forces for an upcoming battle.  
He receives inconsistent information as to the whereabouts of the enemy troops.  Given 
his uncertainty, he does not believe the enemy troops are located either here or there.  
Instead, he surveys the relevant information, accepts a particular location, and proceeds 
to draw up his battle plans.   He does not believe the enemy is arrayed on this particular 
ridge, but because he is forced to make a decision he accepts one possibility as true. 
                                                 
13
 Alston, 2007, p133. 
14
 I think this is probably because the defensive coordinator believes that the quarterback‘s goal is 
to score; accepting that the quarterback will perform a song and dance routine seems 
incompatible with that belief. 
10 
 
1.2 Doxastic Voluntarism 
 In this section I want to examine Alston‘s (implicit) claim that doxastic 
voluntarism is false, with an aim of defending his view.  To clarify, doxastic voluntarism 
is the view that we can directly will ourselves to have certain beliefs.  In what follows I 
will begin with reasons why it is important to resolve this issue.  I will then sketch the 
necessary conditions that must obtain in order for doxastic voluntarism to be true.  
Finally, I will provide two arguments against voluntarism.  Throughout, I will refer to 
Louis Pojman‘s paper on voluntarism, ―Believing, Willing, and the Ethics of Belief.‖
15
 
 Part of the reason we ought to ask if voluntarism is true or false is that Alston‘s 
distinction between acceptance and belief is largely dependent upon its falsity.  The other 
reason deals with the overall project of this paper: the nature of faith.  It is generally 
thought that religious faith ought to be the sort of thing that one is free to choose or 
reject.  The reason, it seems to me, is that in most of the major religions we are held 
accountable for our faith.  Individuals are praised for its possession and condemned for 
lacking it.
16
  However, philosophers have also thought that we cannot be held 
accountable for something if it is beyond our control.  Thus, it seems to me, if belief is 
something beyond our direct control then there are questions about whether or not we can 
be held accountable for it, and furthermore, whether it is a suitable attitude for faith.  
Without addressing questions about an ―ethics‖ of belief, I think it is at least important to 
ask whether or not voluntarism is indeed false.   
                                                 
15
 Pojman, Louis P., 2003. ―Believing, Willing, and the Ethics of Belief‖ in Louis Pojman (ed), 
The Theory of Knowledge, Wadsworth. 
16
 I think that this is generally true of secular faith as well.  Spouses are praised for their faith and 
scorned for lacking it.  Indeed, I also think that part of the reason we want to say that a woman 
has faith that her husband is not cheating on her is that she chooses that attitude. 
11 
 
 If doxastic voluntarism (henceforth just voluntarism) were true, what would be its 
necessary conditions?  Pojman lists three, and I will look at each in turn.  The first is that 
the belief acquisition must be a basic act; the belief must be obtained by a direct act of the 
will. Beliefs obtained indirectly (such as my belief in the Loch Ness monster) would not 
serve as proof for voluntarism.  Furthermore, this is not a claim that all, or even most, of 
our beliefs must be obtained this way.  For voluntarism to be true it is only necessary that 
some of our beliefs be obtained by basic, direct acts of the will. 
 Second, the acquisition must be done in full view of one‘s consciousness.  If it is 
to be the result of the will (in the sense of a conscious decision, and not merely a desire), 
then it must be an act of which we are completely aware. The reason, it seems to me, that 
belief formation must be the result of a conscious decision and not merely the result of 
desire, is that desire could coincide with belief formation and yet could not definitively 
be shown to result in the belief.  Suppose I want to believe I am smart, and eventually 
come to believe this.  It may be that my desire directly caused the formation of a belief.  
However, it may also be the case that my desire caused me to selectively view evidence 
for this conclusion, resulting in my formation of the belief over time (and not as the result 
of a direct act).  As Pojman writes, ―there is a difference between willing to believe and 
believing willingly.‖
17
  It is the former we are concerned with, and thus only a conscious 
decision of the will to believe something would be sufficient for voluntarism.   
Furthermore, as I will mention later in the paper, desires also seem to be the sort thing 
that is largely beyond our ability to control. 
                                                 
17
 Pojman, 2003, p539. 
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 Third, the belief formation must occur independently of the evidence.  Granted, 
one might have some evidence for the proposition, but in order for the belief formation to 
be voluntary it must not be the case that the evidence is decisive in forming the belief.  
Instead, the formation must be the result of a decision on the part of the believer.  Given 
that beliefs represent the way we perceive the world to be, they are usually the result of 
evidence for that perceived reality.  To use an analogy of Pojman‘s, belief formation is 
like a mental scale, where the evidence, pro and con, is placed on either side of the scale.  
As the mind perceives the scale to tip, the relevant belief is formed (either p or not-p).  If 
voluntarism is correct, then the mind can tip the scales either way, per its will, and 
regardless of the relevant evidence. 
 Here is a phenomenological argument, given by Pojman, that voluntarism is false.  
It has only two premises.  The first states that belief formation is a ―happening‖ in which 
the world forces itself upon the subject.  The second states that an occurrence of the 
world forcing itself upon a subject is not something she chooses or does (i.e. it is not a 
direct act).  From this it follows that belief formation is usually not something a subject 
chooses or does.
18
  
 The first premise is the more critical and controversial of the two and therefore 
the one to focus on.  It states that belief formation is an instance of the world forcing 
itself upon a subject.  Its truth follows inductively: when we look at the phenomenon of 
belief acquisition, its various forms all fit this description.  Take for example perceptual 
beliefs.  When I open my eyes and see my tabby cat I cannot prevent myself from seeing 
                                                 
18
 Pojman concedes that this argument cannot show that it is impossible for a subject to directly 
will herself to have a belief; it only shows that such activity would be highly abnormal.  For an 
argument that claims voluntarism is logically impossible, see Bernard Williams‘s ―Deciding to 
Believe.‖ 
13 
 
him.  And, I can no more stop myself from believing that I see him anymore than I can 
stop myself from seeing him.  Just as I cannot help but see him, I cannot help but form 
the perceptual belief.  That‘s not to say that I have no direct control over my sensual 
input.  Of course I could turn away or close my eyes, and no longer see the cat.  I can stop 
myself from seeing him in that way.  But once I open my eyes and focus on the cat, the 
perception and corresponding belief are there, regardless of my will.
19
  It is the same for 
the other senses.  I can neither stop myself from hearing music when it is played near me, 
nor from forming the belief that I hear music.  And so on. Granting then that the first 
premise is true, the second intuitively true, and the conclusion that follows is valid, the 
argument is sound.   
 Pojman also offers a second argument, dealing with the ―logic of belief.‖  It 
demonstrates how voluntarism‘s third premise, that beliefs can be formed independent of 
evidential considerations, is inconsistent with the concept of belief.  Essentially, the 
argument claims that an individual who obtains or holds a belief based upon a direct act 
of the will (independent of evidence) cannot understand the concept of belief itself.  
Beliefs are psychological representations of states of affairs.  They are about the world.  
Furthermore, they are true or false depending on the way the world is—what is actually 
the case.  So, to believe there is a bear in front of me is, in essence, to believe that it is 
true, or the case, that there is a bear in front of me.  Once someone understands this, they 
should also understand that willing to believe something could never make that belief 
true.  If I will myself to believe there is not a bear in front of me that of itself cannot 
                                                 
19
 I think it‘s fair to say that the context here must clearly be well-functioning, normal agents.  
The mentally ill or otherwise might be exceptions. 
14 
 
make it true that there is not.  Understanding this, there becomes no epistemic reason for 
me to retain the belief that the space around me is free of bears. 
 Part of the reason we are concerned with our belief‘s truth or falsity is that they 
guide our actions.  If a bear is chasing me then it is important that my beliefs (e.g. the 
distance of the bear, the distance to a tree, my relative speed, etc.) be reliable 
representations of the world.  Evidence is important because of its capacity to correctly 
determine which states of affairs are actual states of affairs.  Evidence serves as a type of 
―truth-connection‖ that helps to ensure what is believed is true.  Once an individual 
understands this, the will becomes superfluous in belief acquisition.  Thus, once I 
understand the nature of belief, I must realize that the cause of my belief (the will) is the 
wrong sort of cause—it lacks a connection to reality—and the will is unnecessary for my 
belief about bears. 
 These two arguments, the phenomenological and the logical, were meant to refute 
the second and third premises of voluntarism, respectively.  What they show is that, while 
voluntarism seems intuitively true, it is philosophically problematic.  What does this 
mean for faith?  I don‘t want to imply that faith cannot be doxastic.  In fact, both Alston 
and Audi think that doxastic faith is more commendable because it involves more 
cognitive commitment from the subject.  What I do think such arguments show is that we 
ought to take seriously the idea of nondoxastic faith and the part it can play in religious 
faith.
20
 
 
                                                 
20
 I am of the opinion that nondoxastic faith often plays an important role in the genesis of 
doxastic faith, be it religious or otherwise. 
15 
 
1.3 Problems 
Throughout this chapter I have alluded to potential problems with Alston‘s view; 
in this section I want to clarify and focus on those.  Hamid Vahid supplies two of them in 
―Alston on Belief and Acceptance in Religious Faith,‖
21
 and another is found in the 
writings of Robert Audi.   
 Vahid argues that all of Alston‘s examples of acceptance could just as easily be 
described in terms of degrees of belief.  Take the case of the defensive coordinator, which 
Alston describes as a case of acceptance.  The coordinator lacked enough evidence to 
unqualifiedly believe that the quarterback would throw the ball and thus merely accepted 
it.  As Vahid notes, though, why must he unqualifiedly believe it?  It seems quite 
plausible that he could have a weak belief, or a belief with a low degree of confidence.  
He only has some evidence for his conclusion, so he tentatively believes the quarterback 
will throw the ball because this is the most likely of all options, as it seems to him.  
 A second example Alston gives, though I did not discuss it, deals with a 
philosopher‘s acceptance of libertarian free will.  He may not believe we have libertarian 
free will, because he finds the arguments for determinism to be convincing to some 
degree, but he nonetheless accepts we have free will.  Alston writes that  
It doesn‘t seem clear to me that this is the real situation, as it seems clear to me that I 
am now sitting in front of a computer, that I live in Central New York, and that I 
teach at Syracuse University.  Nevertheless, I accept the proposition that we have 
libertarian free will.  I announce this as my position.  I defend it against objections.  I 
draw various consequences from it, and so on.
22
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As before, Vahid argues that we would do just as well to characterize this attitude in 
terms of degrees of belief.  The philosopher, aware of the arguments to the contrary, only 
believes the object to a marginal degree (say .6 or .7—whatever number we assign to 
those beliefs which are neither ―strong‖ nor ―weak‖).   
 While I agree, to a certain extent, with Vahid, I think two points should be said in 
favor of Alston here.  One, as a student of philosophy, I sympathize with Alston‘s second 
example.  There are many philosophical positions that I do not have a strong opinion on, 
even after reflecting upon them.  For instance, no matter how much I deliberate, I cannot 
decide the case of epistemic closure.  In many instances I adopt or choose one particular 
view.  It‘s not clear to me that I believe those views, even with a low degree of belief.   
 The second thing I want to say in favor of acceptance deals with the notion of 
entrenchment.  If a belief is highly entrenched in my cognitive outlook then I will not 
give it up easily, even in the face of perceived counter-evidence.  It seems to me that the 
attitude of acceptance would, under normal conditions, not be deeply entrenched in a 
subject‘s cognitive system.  Alston seems to support this when he writes, ―having 
performed an initial act of accepting it as true, I may require supplementary injections of 
such an act to keep myself in the relevant dispositional state vis-à-vis this position.‖
23
  
Many of the philosophical views I hold are not deeply entrenched and are the sorts of 
views I could easily give up.  Now, which attitude best makes sense of this fact, belief or 
acceptance?  For instance, one day I have a positive attitude towards libertarian free will, 
a week later I do not.  It seems to me that a belief, even one with a low degree, is 
typically given up as a result of counter evidence.  But my changing attitude towards 
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libertarian free will need not be the result of any change in perceived evidence.  It seems 
that I simply no longer accept it, in Alston‘s sense of acceptance.  For whatever reason, I 
no longer include it among those propositions I utilize in decision making and action 
guidance.  To clarify, I do not think that either of the positive things I have said about 
Alston‘s position refutes Vahid‘s criticisms, but they at least give the view more 
plausibility. 
 However, there are questions about the distinctiveness of acceptance from belief 
itself.  In its strongest form, acceptance is almost identical to belief.  For instance, in 
looking at the reasons Alston gives to differentiate acceptance from an assumption, Vahid 
writes that assumptions and hypotheses ―entail regarding a proposition as true without 
sensitivity to whether one is thereby doing so only if it really is true,‖ whereas, 
―accepting a proposition p is, accordingly, a mental state that is regulated by tracking its 
truth.  In other words, on Alston‘s account, acceptance turns out to be a truth-directed 
state very much like belief.‖
24
   
 A similar point confuses me as well.  Alston‘s second conditional (―if S [accepts] 
that p, then if S considers whether it is the case that p, S will tend to feel it to be the case 
that p, with one or another degree of confidence‖), while true of belief, is not true of 
acceptance.  But Alston defines acceptance as ―taking‖ or ―regarding‖ the proposition as 
true.  It seems strange to me that one might regard a proposition as true but not think that 
it is the case?
25
  A weaker account of acceptance might avoid these problems, but then 
what differentiates it from an assumption or hypothesis?  Additionally, Audi writes, 
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be true, then I feel that it is the case.  In taking something as true, I do not hold it to be the case, 
but I still take it as true.  It‘s plausible. 
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―Supposing, then, that there is a kind of cognitive acceptance that is equivalent to non-
doxastic propositional faith, it may also be equivalent to what I call fiducial faith.‖
26
   
 Another criticism of Alston‘s position, suggested by Audi, deals with the 
sufficiency of one‘s acceptance of religious propositions to make one religious.  To put it 
another way, is acceptance a suitable candidate to make sense of, and cash out, the 
attitude of religious faith?  One particular problem Audi notes is that Alston‘s emphasis 
on the act of acceptance is at odds with the concept of faith.  It is true that theologians 
and philosophers normally think that faith ought to be freely chosen; however, many 
instances of faith are not the result of some free act.  A man who has faith that God exists 
might not be aware of any activity on his part that produced this faith. 
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Chapter Two: Hope 
 The next attitude—hope—is one that has a long association with faith.   The 
attitude of hope is often intertwined with faith: the objects of hope are often the same as 
the objects of faith.  The attitudes are so connected that several philosophers have 
suggested that having religious hope is sufficient to make one a person of faith.  In this 
chapter I will give an analysis of hope, note some interesting features of hope, discuss 
―reasonable‖ hopes, and finally evaluate the adequacy of hope for religious faith.  
2.1 An Analysis 
 In this section I want to look at an analysis of hope, its necessary and sufficient 
conditions, offered by Louis Pojman.
27
  He argues there are four necessary conditions for 
hope.  In assessing and critiquing those proposed conditions I will also take in to 
consideration the analyses of hope offered by James Muyskens
28
 and J.P. Day.
29
   
 The first necessary condition is that hope entails a desire that the object of hope 
be realized.
30
  If I hope p,
31
 where p is some proposition, then I want p to be true.  So, if 
Sylvia hopes to pass her test tomorrow then she must have a desire to pass her test 
tomorrow.  It might not seem obvious that desire is necessary for hope, but consider three 
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cases: a farmer who hopes for rain during a draught, a real-estate agent who hopes for the 
market to bounce back, and a meteorologist considering tomorrow's weather.  The first 
two are cases where the individual desires something; thus, it is appropriate to speak of 
their ―hope.‖  The third, the meteorologist, is a case where the individual is largely 
ambivalent about the outcome, lacking any desire either way.  In that case it is 
inappropriate to call the attitude hope.  
 The second necessary condition is that we can only hope for what we believe to 
be possible.  So, if I hope p, then I must believe it is possible
32
 for p to be true.  I cannot 
ever hope to see a round square, because I recognize it is impossible, but perhaps my 
young cousin can hope to.  If Sylvia hopes to pass her test tomorrow then she must 
believe she can pass her test tomorrow.  Likewise, if Sylvia does not believe it is possible 
for her to pass her test then she cannot properly hope that she will pass her test.   
 It is important to note that believing something is possible is not equivalent to 
expecting it.  Sylvia may hope to pass her test tomorrow but not expect to.  Of course, it‘s 
possible that she hopes to pass her test and expects to pass her test, though she need not.  
Without offering a full-blown analysis of expectation, I think it generally goes something 
like this: if I expect something to happen, then I believe it will happen.  Hope, on the 
other hand, can coexist with a significant amount of doubt; doubt strong enough that the 
subject does not expect the object of hope to be realized.  For instance, I may hope to 
marry a supermodel even if I acknowledge that the chances are quite small that I will ever 
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meet one, much less marry one.  My hope is not dependent on an expectation, but upon 
my desire.   
 It is also important to note that although hope entails desire, it is different from 
wishing.  In wishing, the subject need not believe that what is wished for is possible.  I 
can wish I were never born or that I was smarter,
33
 but I cannot hope for either of those 
things.  Once I know the final score of the basketball game I can no longer hope that my 
team won, but I can still wish that they won.  In all three examples, I do not believe the 
facts could be otherwise.
34
  However, if I did (i.e. I believed it possible to change the past 
or alter one's own DNA) then I could rightly hope for any of those things.  
 Given these first two conditions, it is easy to see why hope is non-doxastic.  I may 
hope that I win the lottery and not believe I will win the lottery.  Hope does not entail the 
corollary belief.  Imagine that I am lost at sea.  The situation may be dire enough that I 
lack any belief that I will be rescued.  I may not believe that I will be rescued, if the 
circumstances are grave enough, but I can still hope that I will be rescued.  However, if I 
hope that I will be rescued then I must at least believe it is possible that I will be rescued.  
At the point I stop believing even that then I have lost hope.   
 The third condition, suggested by Pojman, is that hope implies a certain level of 
uncertainty.  I think this might be just to say that if I hope p then I believe not-p is also 
possible.  For instance, if Sylvia hopes that she will pass her test tomorrow then (in 
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addition to believing it is possible for her to pass her test) she must believe it is possible 
for her to fail (or not-p).  This condition may be best seen in hoping about the past.  
Suppose I have not heard the score of the basketball game yesterday, and I hope that my 
team won.  Obviously, in this case, I believe it is possible that my team did not win.  Now 
contrast this with a friend of mine who attended the game and knows the score.  In that 
case it would be odd, and mistaken, if she were to say "I hope the team won yesterday."  
In this case she knows the team won and there is no uncertainty.
35
   
 While nothing of particular importance, for my project anyway, depends upon this 
third condition, it does strike me that this is necessary for hope.  J.P. Day and James 
Muyskens both include this third condition in their respective analyses of hope.  
Influenced by Hume's treatment of hope, and its opposite fear, Day writes that "when A 
believes that P is certain and A desires that P, A no longer hopes that P ...  Similarly, A 
no longer fears that -P when A believes that -P is certain and A desires that P."
36
.  
Muyskens also writes that "it is a part of the force of Hume's analysis that, as he points 
out, once we are certain we go beyond hope to something better, namely, joy."
37
  
 The fourth necessary condition put forward by Pojman is that hope entails a 
disposition to bring about the truth of the proposition if the subject can.  So if Sylvia 
hopes that she will pass her test then she will be disposed (but not guaranteed) to make it 
true that she passes her test.  I take it that this is not to say that she will be disposed to 
study all night; it might just mean that she is disposed to do her best on the test.  Suppose 
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that I hope to go running tomorrow (I'm worried it will rain and I won‘t have enough 
time).  Weather and time permitting, if I choose not to go running tomorrow, then it is 
odd to say that I hoped to go running tomorrow.  Certainly, something else may have 
come up; I may have changed my mind, or may have just been too lazy.  Yet it seems that 
if I hope to go running tomorrow, then tomorrow I will be disposed to go on a run.    
 This fourth condition may strike some readers as false.  Muyskens makes no 
mention of it, but Day briefly does.  He writes that A hopes P entails 
A is disposed to try to bring it about that P.  So that if Tom says that he hopes to 
recover, but disobeys all his doctor's orders, he must be disbelieved.  However, this 
test does not apply to all cases of "A hopes that P," but only to those where the object 
of hope is an action or passion of the subject; in other words, to cases of hoping-to.
38
   
However, I am not inclined to consider it necessary for hope.  A disposition to bring 
about the object of hope seems to be embedded in the subject‘s desire (the first 
condition).  Ultimately, though, this may depend upon the reader‘s understanding of 
desire.  For instance, under an action-based theory of desire, a disposition to act is 
entailed by desire.  Under a pleasure-based theory of desire, though, desire might not 
entail a disposition to act.  I cannot resolve the issue here.
39
 
2.2 Hope, Belief, and Action 
 In the previous section, I established that hope does not entail the corollary belief.  
There are many paradigmatic cases of hope where the subject need not possess the 
relevant belief (e.g. the "lost at sea" case).  However, cases of deep or profound hope do 
seem to entail a type of belief.  Pojman defines profound or deep hope as cases where 
―one is disposed to risk something significant on the possibility of the proposition's being 
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or becoming true."
40
  He admits that such hope does entail a belief in the object of hope.  
A gambler in desperate need of cash, who bets on a long shot to win, typically believes in 
the bet (i.e. the horse, team, etc.).  A belief-in in this context should not be confused with 
an existential belief (e.g. ―I believe in Santa‖).  Instead, it implies something closer to 
trust (as in, ―I believe in you‖).  Religious hopes would seem to often coincide with this 
type of belief or trust.   
 Do belief-in statements entail belief-that statements?  Does, for example, a belief 
in the President entail a belief that the President exists?  Essentially, at issue here is a 
question of whether or not religious hope (typically a nondoxastic attitude) entails belief.  
Pojman argues that belief-in or trust (and by extension profound hope) does not entail 
propositional beliefs (a point also argued for by H.H. Price
41
).  Instead, he suggests that a 
belief that x possibly exists is a necessary condition for profound hope.  He cites as an 
example a scientist who hypothesizes the existence of an entity and devotes considerable 
time and energy into discovering it.  He need not believe it exists, but he believes it 
possibly exists.  In his tests and work he acts as though it exists.  A further example 
provided by Price: it was possible to believe in universal suffrage long before it existed. 
 In the case of the scientist, his projects and life are shaped as though the entity 
existed.  Pojman concludes that a person with profound or deep hope will live as though 
the object of hope were true or would become true.  The sailors aboard Columbus' ships 
may not believe the world is round, but their hope leads them to live on the hypothesis 
that it is true.  Explorers, searching for the fountain of youth, may not have believed it 
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existed, but their actions were guided by the possibility of its existence.  Finally, a 
woman on her deathbed may not believe some wonder drug or miracle cure will heal her, 
but she may nonetheless place her trust in it.   
 A broader point can be made about hope generally then.  Someone who hopes 
often has a disposition to act as though they believed the object of hope was true.  
Muyskens writes 
An agent who hopes acts in large part like a person who actually believes that the 
object of his hopes is real.  Hoping for something involves practical consequences 
and entails certain actions or dispositions to act.  One who hopes for p arranges his 
life and emotions as if p were the case ... If one hopes that p one is disposed to act as 
if p.  Hence the actions of the person who hopes for p may be very similar to those of 
the person who expects (or believes) that p.
42
  
 
People who hope for things have a tendency to organize their lives as though the object of 
hope were true.  I may apply for admission to Harvard and only hope to be accepted.  I 
may act as though I would be accepted by buying Harvard shirts and paraphernalia.  
That‘s not to say that my disposition to act will prevent me from applying to other 
schools (nor would that be the case if I believed I would be accepted: I can still recognize 
that it‘s practical to apply elsewhere).    
2.3 Reasonable Hope 
 Since hope is a nondoxastic attitude the standards for reasonable belief cannot be 
used in assessing reasonable hope.  It is important, then, to ask exactly what constitutes 
reasonable hope.  For instance, would it be reasonable for me to hope that I walk on the 
moon some day?  What if I hoped to walk on the moon without wearing a space suit?  As 
before, my primary focus will be on Pojman‘s work, with references to Muyskens and 
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Day to supplement the arguments. 
 The first step in establishing the grounds for reasonable hope is to recognize that 
hope has two elements, a desiderative and an estimative.  If either (the desire or belief, 
respectively) is unreasonable then the hope is unreasonable.  The desiderative is quickly 
dealt with.  For example, it is generally unreasonable to hope to die, since that desire 
conflicts with almost all of the other desires a healthy rational agent might have.  I would 
suspect that it is typically not the desiderative element of hope that makes it unreasonable 
(when it is such). 
 However, the desiderative element in hope plays an important role in the morality 
of hope.  For instance, there may not be anything wrong with believing a natural disaster 
will kill thousands of people tomorrow, but there is certainly something morally 
repugnant about hoping it.  Muyskens includes this as a necessary condition for 
reasonable hope, but I fail to see why it should be.  Can't it be reasonable to hope 
something, even if it's immoral?  Suppose that I am a terrorist; if my ultimate purpose in 
life is spread terror and mayhem, wouldn‘t it be reasonable to hope that I do so 
tomorrow?  I think it would be reasonable to have such a hope (though I make no 
pronouncement on the overarching aim), and I would think it is also fairly immoral to 
have such a hope.   
 Next, the estimative/belief element can make a hope unreasonable.   The 
estimation of the possibility of the object of hope can be unreasonable.  A hope to draw a 
round square would be unreasonable because no such thing is possible.  A hope that two 
plus two equals four would also be unreasonable, for the opposite reason.  Two plus two 
always equals four and thus the estimation that such an occurrence is less than certain 
27 
 
(granting that hope entails that the object of hope be uncertain) would be unreasonable.  
This last example might not sit well with some, since the third condition for hope (its 
object must be uncertain) is contentious.  I have argued it is a necessary condition.  
However, if one were to reject it then I think it would be reasonable to hope that two plus 
two equals four (though odd).  Pojman writes that "at the very least we can say that a 
hope is irrational if the agent should know that the object in question is either certain or 
impossible."
43
 
 Pojman‘s quote leads to an important question: what type of possibility is being 
used in evaluation?  Impossible might mean either logically impossible or nomologically 
impossible (i.e. impossible under the actual laws of nature).  To illuminate the distinction, 
it is logically possible to hold your breath for an hour, but not nomologically possible.  
To iterate an earlier question, my hope of walking on the moon (sans space suit) might be 
logically possible but not nomologically possible.  I think it is clear that nomological 
possibility is the relevant ―possibility‖ (and, as such, my hope would be unreasonable
44
).   
 Pojman, however, argues for something stronger than nomological possibility.  
He writes, "there is also the phenomenon of something being so close to impossible or 
certain that hoping may be irrational, as when an average person hopes to live to 200 or 
an average high school football player with no great promise hopes to make the pros and 
gives up all else in order to do this."
45
  The second case fits both types of possibility (it is 
both logically and nomologically possible for the quarterback to succeed professionally), 
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yet is viewed as unreasonable.
46
   Since it does not seem, at least to me, intuitive that such 
hope is unreasonable, it is worthwhile to ask why it should be.  After all, why should such 
hope be unreasonable? 
 I think one reason we are inclined to discourage such hope has less to do with its 
(un)reasonableness and more to do with practical considerations.  It is impractical to have 
such a hope because it might lead one to neglect more worthwhile pursuits (in this case, 
things like college applications).  Given that he cannot succeed professionally, other 
pursuits and interests will take on greater importance.  Thus, such a hope is impractical 
because it interferes with other projects.  But it doesn‘t seem to me that if something is 
impractical it is unreasonable.   Cases of wives whose husbands are missing in war come 
to mind.  After a certain length of time it might be impractical to hope for the return of 
one‘s spouse (presumably because it hinders one from getting on with other projects) but 
it doesn‘t seem to be unreasonable.  In fact, in many cases those spouses return after 
lengthy intervals, and the hope is rewarded. 
 But in most cases there are other important considerations.  We ought to ask about 
those beliefs presupposed by the hope.  This is a point made by Muyskens.  Hope is only 
reasonable if the beliefs it presupposes (those beyond the estimative element) are also 
reasonable.  So, for instance, if the quarterback bases his hope on his belief that he 
possesses the talent to succeed professionally, then his hope is unreasonable (because the 
latter belief is unreasonable, or so I presume).  It seems to me that if we use this test, then 
cases such as the quarterback‘s may also not be unreasonable in certain situations, 
depending upon the presupposed belief.  I think this test allows us to focus on 
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nomological possibility as the relevant possibility.  We can further ask about other 
presupposed attitudes when looking at highly improbable hopes. 
2.4 The Adequacy of Hope for Religious Commitment 
  Having explored the nature of hope, we might wonder if having hope in religious 
propositions is sufficient to make one a person of faith.  For instance, if I hope that God 
exists, then could it be said that I have faith that God exists (in the absence of such 
belief)?  In this section, I want to consider that possibility and examine some arguments 
to the contrary proposed by Robert Audi. 
 First, Audi notes
47
 that hope can coexist with a higher level of doubt than faith.  I 
might have strong doubts that I will walk on the moon before my thirtieth birthday, but I 
could still hope to.  It seems less plausible that I could have faith that I will walk on the 
moon.  It also seems natural to talk of faith devolving into mere hope in the face of 
overwhelming doubt.  Hope is a weaker attitude than faith, and may be impossible of 
doing the ―work‖ of faith, so to speak.   
 Second, hope does not entail an important condition that is necessary for faith.  
There is a positive element in faith not found in hope.  Faith, as I will argue later, entails 
a positive evaluation of the object of faith.  That is to say, if I have faith that God exists, 
then I regard this as a good state of affairs.  If I did not, or I regarded it as a bad thing, 
then I could not be said to have faith.  For now, let it be granted that faith has this feature.   
 Hope does not entail such an evaluation.  Hope does entail desire; but that desire 
does not entail that one positively evaluate the object of hope.  As a recovering alcoholic 
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can desire alcohol, it seems we can desire those things we do not regard as good.
48
  
Furthermore, as we can have conflicting desires, so it seems we can have conflicting 
hopes.  One could even hope incontinently: my belief system might consider capital 
punishment morally repugnant, but after a man murders my family I still may hope, 
despite my better judgment, that he receives the death penalty.  It does not seem that one 
could have such incontinent faith. 
 Another issue, which occurs to me, is how hope-faith could be voluntary.  This is 
a similar worry to the one I raised about belief and faith.  Like belief, hope seems to be—
to a certain extent—beyond our ability to control.  That is because hope's two 
components, belief and desire, are not the sorts of things we have direct control over.  I 
have already argued that belief is largely beyond our control; desire is, to a large extent, 
as well.  I cannot, for instance, create in myself a desire for cheese.  Instead, desires seem 
to come and go, like emotions.  Perhaps I can indirectly alter my desires, say by staring at 
pictures of delicious cheese, or smelling its pungent aroma.  But what about, say, a desire 
that a friend do well on a test?  How can I bring about this desire if I do not already have 
it?  Thus, hope is, like belief, largely involuntary.
49
  Like belief, then, there are also 
questions about how a faith conceived as hope could ever be meritorious.   
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Chapter Three: Audi’s Nondoxastic Faith 
 Alston and Pojman suggested that acceptance and hope, respectively, are attitudes 
capable of making sense of the concept of faith.  The author I will now look at, Robert 
Audi, suggests that there is a type of faith not reducible to any other attitude, but instead 
is its own distinct attitude.  According to Audi, when we say that someone has faith we 
do not imply any other attitude, be it hope, acceptance, or belief.   
 Audi writes, "consider faith that God loves humanity.  Might this be a distinct 
kind of attitude?  On my view, just as one can have faith that a friend will survive cancer, 
without either believing or disbelieving this, one can have such non-belief-entailing faith 
regarding religious propositions."
50
  It seems to me that Audi takes it for granted that 
secular nondoxastic (or fiducial) faith is plausible; furthermore, he feels that this fact 
lends some credence to his claim that religious fiducial faith is plausible.  Elsewhere he 
writes, "whether in secular or religious cases, neither kind of faith clearly requires belief 
of the proposition in question."
51
  In this section I examine the reasons for such a 
conclusion, as well as some of the reasons to the contrary. 
 In what follows, I take a detailed look at the arguments proposed by Audi.  He 
claims that while faith may often involve (i.e. entail) belief, it need not.  I begin with the 
arguments for his view.  Second, I consider several objections to Audi‘s view proposed 
by Dana Radcliffe.  Third, I address questions regarding the adequacy of nondoxastic 
faith for religious commitment.  Next, I give a short analysis of trust and its relation to 
Audi‘s view.  Then, I offer a brief account of how nondoxastic faith can be voluntary.  
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Finally, I consider the epistemic status of nondoxastic faith.   
3.1 Arguments For 
 Audi has written extensively
52
 on the subject of nondoxastic faith.  Nowhere, 
however, does he give a proper analysis of such "faith."  As such it is difficult to discuss 
the merit of his views.  Audi instead focuses, in much of his writing, on contrasts 
between faith and belief.  I suspect that by demonstrating what faith need not be (i.e. 
contrasting it with belief), Audi hopes to cash out something of what faith is.  I will 
follow his approach and focus on the differences between faith and belief in my 
exposition.  Throughout his papers, Audi discusses three reasons
53
 to differentiate faith 
and belief.  I will begin with (as I perceive it) the weakest of these and move to the 
strongest.  For clarity sake, I will refer to them as arguments A, B, and C, respectively.    
 The first reason, argument A, is that, in most cases, if someone unqualifiedly 
believes p, then it is odd to express that attitude towards p as faith.  For instance, if I 
unqualifiedly believe I will finish my thesis on time then I will most likely not express 
my attitude as "faith that I will finish my thesis on time."  The reason, Audi suggests, is 
that expressing my attitude as faith implies, normally, that I do not believe the 
proposition.  Audi writes that "if, from previous experience (or indeed whatever reason), 
I unqualifiedly believe that Felicia will meet a certain challenge, I will tend not to express 
my attitude by saying I have faith that she will; for saying this would at least normally 
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imply that I do not actually believe it."
54
  Essentially, I take Audi's point to be that in 
ordinary usage "faith" concedes a certain amount of doubt that is incompatible with 
outright belief. 
 Audi takes it for granted that the everyday usage of faith implies something less 
than belief.  To understand his point I think it is important to highlight the nature of belief 
Audi is talking about.  He says that faith typically implies something less that 
"unqualified" belief.  He differentiates a belief p from a belief that p is probable, or a 
disposition to believe p.  Faith, in ordinary usage, may very well imply these sorts of 
things, but Audi‘s point is that it does not imply belief p.  It does seem that paradigmatic 
cases of faith tend to confirm Audi‘s suggestion.  For instance, if I have faith that my 
seriously ill friend will recover then, in many cases, I probably do not believe that my 
seriously ill friend will recover.  The argument, I take it, is not that faith cannot coincide 
with belief; the argument is that our ordinary usage of the words tend to support the 
distinction Audi is drawing.  He confirms this in the following passage:  
Indeed, at least in non-religious contexts the closer we come to having a belief that p, 
the less natural it is to speak of faith rather than simply of belief that p.  If I believe a 
student will find a position, if would be misleading to say I have faith that this will 
occur, except perhaps as a way of indicating a lack of confidence.  It is possible to 
have faith that something is so when we also believe it is, but propositional faith—
faith that—is often non-doxastic.
55
 
 
 The second reason, argument B, to recognize faith as a distinct attitude has to do 
with three
56
 related contrasts Audi finds in faith and belief.  They are ways in which faith 
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is supposedly noticeably different from belief.   
 First, if Fred believes p and p is false, then we are apt to say he was mistaken.  
However, if Fred has faith p and p is false, then we are less inclined to say that Fred was 
mistaken.  Instead we may suggest that he was disappointed, or had misplaced his faith.  
Suppose Fred has reason to suspect his wife is cheating on him.  If he believes she is not, 
and she is, then he is mistaken.  However, if he has faith that she is not then perhaps he 
was naïve, or foolish, to have such faith; it is not entirely clear that his faith was 
mistaken.   
 The second contrast, also discussed by William P. Alston,
57
 relates to the first in 
regards to false propositions.  Other things being equal, upon learning that something is 
false, one is more likely to be surprised if it is believed.  Suppose that Bob believes 
something that Sue only has faith in.  Upon learning that it is false, Bob is likely to be 
more surprised than Sue.  If Bob believes that he and Sue will not be fired this week, then 
he will probably be surprised if they are.  However, if Sue has faith that she and Bob will 
not be fired this week, then she may be more prepared for the end of her employment.  
This is in part, I suspect, because faith involves risk (that p may be false, since there 
generally is not sufficient evidence to support p) and the person who has faith is normally 
aware of this.  Naturally, Sue will have some type of response to her misplaced faith.  For 
reasons I will discuss later, I think Sue‘s response will be disappointment rather than 
surprise. 
 The third contrast is related to the second.  Faith can coexist with a higher degree 
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of doubt than belief.  Sue may be aware of the evidence that she will be fired and even 
have a strong intuition that she will be.  Despite strong doubts to the contrary, Sue may 
still have faith that she will not be fired.  On the other hand, if Bob has strong doubts that 
he will lose his job then he probably cannot unqualifiedly believe he will not.  I would 
even suggest that the contrast is stronger than Audi presents it.  Faith and belief can both 
coexist with various degrees of doubt, faith more so than belief.  What about outright 
doubt?  Doubt is a negative attitude, and I‘m inclined to understand it as a disposition to 
believe not-p.  Thus, if I doubt that aliens exist then I am disposed towards believing that 
aliens do not exist.  Under this interpretation, belief cannot seemingly coexist with doubt.  
It does seem, however, that faith might be able to. 
 The third reason, argument C, to recognize faith as a distinct attitude has to do 
with the nature of faith itself.  There is a positive element in faith not found in belief.  
Faith, unlike belief, is evaluative.  That is to say, if Noel has faith p, then Noel places 
some value on p.  For instance, suppose that Noel has faith that her friend's cancer will go 
into remission.  To have faith, Noel must place some value on the recovery, which is to 
say she thinks it would be good.  If Noel did not think it was good, or in fact wished her 
friend would not recover, then she could not be said to have faith.
58
  
 However, there are supposed cases of "faith" where the subject does not regard 
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the object of faith as something good.  For instance, suppose I believe that God exists (on 
faith) but regard this state of affairs as unfortunate (say, because I viewed God as 
sadistic).  Notice here two things.  First, it is not clear to me that we ought to describe this 
as a case of faith.  We are tempted to call it faith, I think, because the propositional 
object, that God exists, is usually an object of faith.  Furthermore, it is usually not held on 
the basis of evidence.  Second, if Audi is right (that faith and belief are distinct attitudes) 
then the attitude in question here is belief and not faith.  I suspect that to believe ―on 
faith‖ means something like the following: faith evolved into belief.  The genesis for the 
belief was faith, but the belief itself is not faith.  
 This leads to a final, and important, point about faith that Audi makes.  
Propositional faith implies a disposition to believe p.  If Audi is right that faith does not 
entail belief then why are we so inclined to think it does?  One reason is that 
propositional faith implies a disposition to believe p.  If Cheryl truly does have faith that 
Elvis is alive then she will be inclined to believe he is alive, if she does not already.  A 
disposition to believe, though, is not the same thing as believing.
59
 
 Another, and perhaps stronger, reason we are inclined to think that faith entails 
belief is that faith cannot coexist with a belief not-p.   I cannot have faith that God exists 
if I believe that God does not exist.  Or, for instance, if I believe that my friend will not 
recover from her illness then I cannot have faith that she will.  So, if I do have faith that 
she will recover then I cannot believe that she will not.  This seems to imply that I do 
believe she will recover.  This need not be the case though.  I very well may have no 
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belief on the matter.  I think perhaps this is a function of doubt and hope both working in 
the life of an individual. 
 While faith can coexist with more doubt than belief, it cannot survive 
overwhelming doubt.  At a certain point, faith becomes mere hope when doubt becomes 
too strong.  Or, the doubt may be such that it undermines the positive outlook of faith, 
causing it to no longer be faith.  Suppose someone living in the USSR has faith that the 
party agenda will be carried out.  Over time, she begins to doubt the value of such a 
thing, to the point that she no longer considers it to be a good thing.  At that point she has 
lost faith that the party agenda will be carried out (even if she comes to believe that the 
party agenda will be carried out).  The process, over time, where the doubts come 
creeping in, may be seen as losing one‘s faith in the face of consuming doubt. 
3.2 Arguments Against 
 In this section (as well as a some of the next) I wish to examine several criticisms 
put forth by Dana Radcliffe in his paper "Nondoxastic Faith: Audi on Religious 
Commitment."  Radcliffe argues that Audi's nondoxastic faith is insufficient to make one 
a "person of faith."  To put it another way, nondoxastic faith is inadequate to support 
religious commitment.  In doing so, Radcliffe argues several of Audi's arguments fail.  
Before addressing questions of the adequacy of fiducial faith, in this section I examine 
Radcliffe‘s rejection of Audi‘s arguments and Radcliffe‘s own proposed analysis of faith. 
 For Audi, if I believe p then I will not express my attitude as faith p.  This is 
because saying I have faith p normally implies I do not actually believe p.  Radcliffe 
rejects Audi's suggestion that "faith" typically implies something less than belief.  
Instead, Radcliffe thinks that use of the word "faith" implies "not an absence of belief, 
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but an acknowledgement by the speaker that there are reasons for doubting the truth of 
the proposition, which he nevertheless believes."
60
  Imagine I am working on my thesis, 
and my advisor considers whether or not I will finish it on time.  If he unqualifiedly 
believes that I will then is it odd to express it as faith that I will because (1) faith 
normally implies a lack of belief (Audi) or (2) faith implies belief but an 
acknowledgement that are reasons for doubting the truth of the proposition (Radcliffe)? 
 It is not clear to me how to understand Radcliffe's analysis.  For instance, this idea 
that "faith" implies "reasons for doubting the truth of the proposition."  There are reasons 
for doubting almost any proposition.  Perhaps what he means is that on the whole, on 
balance, there are more reasons for doubting the truth of the proposition than there are for 
believing it. That cannot be right though, because then faith, by definition, is 
unreasonable.  It may be that, ultimately, faith is unreasonable; but surely it's incorrect to 
define it in a way that is patently unreasonable?  Radcliffe's own writings rule this 
possibility out, anyway: he writes that if I have faith p then I also believe p, "all while 
recognizing that my belief, while not irrational
61
, may go beyond what the evidence 
would justify.‖
62
  Certainly for a belief to be rational (or perhaps just not irrational) there 
cannot be overriding counter-evidence.
63
   
While it puzzles me how such faith would not be irrational (is there a sort of 
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middle ground: beliefs which are neither rational nor irrational?), there is something 
attractive about Radcliffe's position.  People believe all sorts of things, and many times 
we describe their belief as faith because they believe despite adequate evidence for the 
truth of the belief.  As Radcliffe notes, faith "conversationally implies concession, but 
what is conceded is the disputability, or perhaps even the inadequacy (by some objective 
standard), of the belief's grounds."
64
  Yet, it seems to me that Audi is right regarding the 
use of faith in conversation.  It very well may concede inadequate evidence, but it also 
concedes something less than belief.  Someone says to me, ―do you believe that?‖ and I 
respond, ―no, but I have faith.‖ 
 I think there are some additional problems with Radcliffe's proposed analysis.  
What happens when we apply it to other examples?  The first example I have in mind is a 
case with overwhelming counter-evidence.  The second is a case with overwhelming 
positive evidence.   
 First, suppose a woman comes to suspect that her husband is cheating on her.  For 
various reasons (i.e. reasons of the sort that tend to indicate marital infidelity; e.g. late 
nights, lipstick on collars, etc.) she comes to doubt his loyalty to her.  Yet, given their 
history and the value she places on their relationship, she has faith that he is not cheating 
(until the truth is made clear).  It is a case where there are very strong reasons to suspect 
the husband is cheating. 
 Second, suppose there has been a drought for some time, and a farmer's crops are 
on the verge of failure.   He is at his wits' end, and despairs that all will be lost (times are 
hard, obviously).  Imagine further that the weather forecast for the next day is a ninety-
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five percent chance of rain. Because of the length of the drought and his own hardship, 
the farmer struggles to admit that it will, in fact, rain tomorrow.  Can he still have faith 
that it will rain tomorrow? 
 I do not claim that either of these examples serves as a counterexample to 
Radcliffe‘s analysis.  In fact, it could probably make sense of both (in the first, I imagine 
it is just irrational faith; in the second I suspect the answer is ―no‖).  What I do think, 
however, is that both cases fit much more neatly under Audi‘s conception of faith.  In the 
first the evidence properly prevents her belief, but not her faith.
65
  In the second case the 
farmer cannot believe but can still have faith (and it is properly called faith because of the 
positive evaluation he places on the object of faith).   
 One final thought on Radcliffe‘s analysis.  It might seem that Radcliffe has in 
mind something like probability beliefs.  If the evidence makes some proposition, p, 
eighty-five percent likely then we ought to hold that belief to be eighty-five percent likely 
to be true.  Thus, if the evidence makes some proposition, p, fifty-two percent likely and 
if I hold p with a belief of eighty-five percent, then I have faith.  Thus faith embodies a 
belief that, while perhaps not irrational, goes beyond what the evidence justifies.   
 If this were what Radcliffe had in mine there would be two problems with it.  
First, probability beliefs are controversial and do not seem to be supported by our 
perceptions of our own beliefs.  Beliefs are generally just held, perhaps with varying 
strength or weakness, but lacking probability estimates (at most, perhaps we have some 
type of belief hierarchy, ranking some beliefs as stronger or weaker than others
66
).  
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Second, if faith involves probability estimates higher than the evidence warrants then 
faith seems, to me, to be decidedly unreasonable.  Again, perhaps faith is irrational, but 
why characterize an attitude from the outset in such a way that makes it irrational?  Is it 
always irrational to have faith that a friend will recover from a horrible illness? 
 However, I don‘t think the real problem with Radcliffe‘s analysis depends on 
probability estimates.  The analysis can be conceived without mention of probability.  Or, 
it could be construed as a type of conviction: beliefs held more firmly than the evidence 
warrants.  The real problem with his analysis is that it ignores the positive element of 
faith not found in belief.  For instance, can I have faith that the sun will rise tomorrow?  
If I can it is clearly called faith, not because of anything to do with belief, but because of 
the positive evaluation I place on that state of affairs. 
3.3 The Adequacy of Nondoxastic Faith for Religious Commitment 
 While I think one of the most fascinating aspects of Audi‘s nondoxastic faith is its 
demarcation of an attitude people decidedly have from time to time (i.e. ―secular‖ faith), 
its real import is the implications it has for religious commitment.  Before turning to that, 
however, it is important to ask whether or not a nondoxastic conception of faith is 
adequate to ―do the work,‖ so to speak, of ―faith‖ in religious commitment.  Essentially, 
it is a question of whether or not nondoxastic faith can serve as a guiding force in the life 
of a religious individual.  To that end, Radcliffe argues it cannot.  In what follows, I 
address Radcliffe‘s criticism and explore how Audi thinks nondoxastic faith operates in 
the religious life. 
 Audi is keenly aware of the question, and writes, ―how, it may be asked, can I 
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center my life on a view not even really believed?  The question is worrisome.‖
67
  In 
anticipation of such a question, he notes two points: 
First, religious behavior can flow from nondoxastic faith just as it can from belief: a 
cognitively projected conception of the world can structure one's behavior in 
essentially the same way that a flatly accepted conception can.  This is in part 
because—and here is a second point by way of reply—a kind of conviction is quite 
possible without belief: One can, for instance, grant that one does not know or flatly 
believe that God exists, and that only one's faith is justified, without lacking a sense 
of surety, even a kind of certitude, about many aspects of God.  For instance, 
regarding God's sovereignty over life and death, one might have an attitude of 
certitude about the appropriateness of conceiving human life under the aspect of 
diving governance.  The existential propositions about God are objects of rational 
faith and not of belief; but normative propositions about God and many concerning 
how life should be lived in a world under God are believed, and may be strongly 
believed.  Even if one‘s theistic picture of the world is expressed by a fiduciary 
projection, and not by a set of believed propositions, one may unqualifiedly and 
rationally believe that the world so conceived, and human life conducted in accord 
with that conception, are good.
68
 
 
The question: can nondoxastic faith produce religious behavior?  Radcliffe argues that 
looking at Audi‘s claim closely, the behavior flows not from nondoxastic faith, but from 
belief.  He writes that the "confidence which motivated religious behavior in this case 
derives, not from one's nondoxastic propositional faith, but from one's normative beliefs 
about the value of employing a given religious conception in thinking (nondoxastically) 
about the world.  That is, the conviction which leads to actions prescribed by the religious 
conception does not flow from one's propositional faith, as Audi contends."
69
   
 But notice there is a problem with Radcliffe's claim.  Non-theists may also hold 
normative beliefs about God.  For instance, an agnostic might very well believe that if 
God existed it would be appropriate to do the sorts of things religious individuals do.  
However, we do not expect the normative beliefs held by non-theists to produce religious 
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behavior.  The reason is that their conception of the world is non-theistic.  Obviously a 
positive attitude regarding God‘s existence (e.g. belief, faith, acceptance, etc.; or perhaps 
whatever results from a Pascalian wager) is required for religious behavior.   
 Furthermore, it seems clear to me that a projected picture of reality can affect 
behavior in the same way that a definitively believed picture of reality can.  This is 
essentially what happens in the case of Alston‘s acceptance.  It is what happens in the 
case of theoretical or practical reasoning.  Consider, for example, a scientist who 
postulates some hypothesis and then acts upon it.  The scientist need not, and probably 
does not, believe the hypothesized picture of reality is true; yet behavior can flow from 
this projection.  It seems to me that there is no reason to accept Radcliffe‘s criticism: a 
fiducial projection of reality can affect behavior just as other nondoxastic attitudes do.   
3.4 Trust 
 In this section I give a brief analysis of trust.  I do this, in part, because Audi 
refers to his nondoxastic faith as fiducial—of or relating to trust—faith.  To understand 
Audi‘s reasons for associating nondoxastic faith with trust it will be helpful to understand 
trust itself.  I also provide this short analysis because, historically, it has often been 
recognized that faith is deeply intertwined with trust. 
 The first thing to note about trust is that it is, by its very nature, risky.  When 
someone trusts they run the risk that the one they trust will fail to do that which they are 
entrusted to do.  Thus, trust involves a venture: an action where the outcome is largely 
beyond the ability of the subject, or the one who trusts, to control.  Classic examples of 
trust are one‘s trust in a bank to protect one‘s money, or trusting strangers on the street 
not to do you bodily harm.  In both cases the outcomes (the safety of your money and 
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your body, respectively) are, in large part, beyond the control of the one who trusts.   
 The two examples illustrate a further point about trust: the subject trusts some 
agent or entity.  Trust is interpersonal.  Even trust in an impersonal bank, say, is best 
understood in terms of interpersonal relations.  By and large, however, we trust people.  
Furthermore, we typically trust people to do something.
70
  We trust our friends to tell us 
the truth, we trust the government to look after our well-being, and we trust our 
babysitters to diligently watch our children. 
 An important question in considerations of trust is when, if ever, is it rational?  It 
is a difficult question because trust, being inherently risky, appears to also be inherently 
irrational.  For instance, epistemic reasons to trust appear to diminish the trust itself: if I 
have good epistemic reasons to believe that someone is telling me the truth, then it seems 
I no longer need to trust that person to tell me the truth.  Furthermore, even if trust can be 
rational, it seems virtually impossible for all the trusting we do to be rational.  Nearly 
every human activity involves a level of trust (from hiring a plumber, to driving a car), 
and it would be impossible to ensure that we had epistemic reasons for all of our trust.
71
   
 For this reason, questions about rational, or warranted, trust are not always 
framed in epistemic (or ―truth-directed‖) language.  For example, some philosophers
72
 
have argued that the rationality of trust should be understood as ―end-directed.‖  For 
instance, perhaps I do not have epistemic reasons to trust my wife, but doing so might 
serve some end (i.e. the promotion of a healthy relationship).  This is to say that trust has 
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some value, be it cooperation, autonomy, or even knowledge.
73
 
 Trust is particularly relevant to Audi‘s view in that trust requires a certain 
conception of the world.  For instance, in order for me to trust strangers in a crowded 
subway I must see the world, and people in general, as trustworthy.  My perception of 
reality must be one in which strangers on crowded subways do not generally harm each 
other.  Furthermore, that picture of the world need not be definitely held, but only 
projected (for instance, on an ―end-directed‖ view of trust).  Victims of trauma, for 
instance rape, no longer see the world as a safe and caring place.  They can no longer 
trust because they no longer hold, or are capable of adopting, a particular view of the 
world.  I think this talk of projection—generally an unjustified one—is one of the reasons 
why trust and faith are so intertwined.  It also helps to explain how people come to ―lose‖ 
their faith.  Victims of trauma might no longer be able to project a picture of reality as 
watched over by a benevolent God.  They have lost their faith; they have lost their trust. 
 Finally, like belief and hope, trust is not something we can generally will 
ourselves to have.  For instance, Annette Baier writes, "‗Trust me!‘ is for most of us an 
invitation which we cannot accept at will—either we do already trust the one who says it, 
in which case it serves at best as reassurance, or it is properly responded with, ‗Why 
should and how can I, until I have cause to?‘."
74
  I can no more will myself to trust a 
dangerous-looking stranger than I can will myself to believe that he is harmless.  Like 
belief, trust can be nurtured and brought about indirectly, particularly by addressing the 
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trustworthiness of the one to be trusted. 
3.5 Nondoxastic Voluntarism 
  Many of the attitudes discussed thus far are largely involuntary.  What about 
fiducial faith then?  Can Audi‘s view explain how faith can be meritorious—something 
which views involving belief and hope are hard pressed to do?  Audi writes,  
There is also a respect in which it heightens the volitional dimension.  If you take your 
grounds for a view to be conclusive, you normally have no choice but accept it; if, on 
the other hand, you embrace a faith (partly) on the basis of indications you believe 
significant but far from conclusive, you may rationally choose to take some cognitive 
risk, hoping for further confirmation and allowing the faith to nurture the hope, while 
the hope—leading to an openminded search—may reinforce the faith.  In this sense, 
faith that is aware of its own risks, and is nurtured by a steadfast religious devotion, 
can express a kind of religious commitment not possible for those to whom religious 
truths are obvious.
75
 
 
I think this is partly because the idea of a ―projection‖ requires some activity on the part 
of the subject.  It involves an active commitment to see the world in a particular way.  
Note that it might not be the result of a particular choice (as in the case of acceptance), 
but like acceptance, it involves a somewhat voluntary commitment to a certain attitude.  I 
say somewhat because it‘s not clear that faith is entirely free (for instance, there are 
people who, no matter how they try, cannot have faith that God exists).  Yet, the taking of 
risk and the fiduciary projection require some (free) activity on the part of the one who 
has faith. 
3.6 Reasonable Nondoxastic Faith 
 In this section I examine whether the standards of rationality for fiducial faith and 
belief are different.  Could, for instance, fiducial faith that God exists be rational even if 
belief that God exists is not?  Nowhere does Audi give the necessary conditions for 
                                                 
75
 Audi 1991 p229. 
47 
 
rational (fiducial) faith.  I think this is because, in part, doing so would also require 
establishing grounds for rational belief, a task he is not concerned with here.
76
  Similarly, 
I do not think my project requires I lay out necessary conditions for reasonable faith.  It 
will be enough if it can be shown that the standards for rational faith are less than those 
for rational belief (whatever those are).  To that end I want to briefly look at several of 
the comments Audi makes on the topic.   
 Since we are concerned with questions of rationality, Audi first points out that we 
ought to note the differences between rationality and justification.  Skeptical influences, 
he claims, tend to make us conflate the two.  They are not the same, however, and it is 
possible that even if religious faith (or belief) is not justified, it very well may be rational. 
It is important, then, to note their differences. 
 For one, rationality is the more global concept.  It is the broader term; one can be 
rational in an overall way without reference to a particular attitude.  Justification, on the 
other hand, pertains to specific attitudes.  A person cannot be justified, strictly speaking, 
but they can be justified in having a particular attitude.  A justified belief, for instance, 
rests on the grounds that tend to give us knowledge.  Whereas a rational belief is 
grounded in that which, in some sense, makes up a rational person. 
 There is also a difference, pertaining to rationality and justification, in the 
relationship between their source and their role in discourse.  Audi writes, "rationality is 
more a matter of minimal permissibility, justification more a matter of a kind of ground 
specifically connected with what we tend to conceive as the basic truth-conducive 
sources, above all perception, introspection, memorial impressions, and conceptual 
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reflection."
77
  That is to say, when we justify our attitudes we cite and point to particular 
sources of justification.  However, this is not the case for rationality.
78
     
 Audi sums up the difference between rationality and justification nicely, writing, 
As compared with justification, rationality is more readily achieved by a cognitive 
outlook satisfactory by one‘s own lights, though some intersubjective standards, such 
as consistency, are clearly relevant; justification is more a matter of meeting a minimal 
intersubjective standard, including an appropriate cognitive grounding in the basic 
truth-conducive sources.
79
  If my beliefs are mutually consistent and not obviously 
disconfirmed in my own experience, this yields a presumption in favor of their 
rationality, even if I have no grounds that would constitute a justification of them; but 
it does not yield a presumption, or at least not as strong a presumption, of their 
justification.‖
80
  
 As I mentioned, Audi never explicitly says why faith requires less than belief to 
be rational.  He does write ―other things being equal, the greater the confidence embodied 
in a cognitive attitude toward a proposition, the more is required for the rationality or 
justification of a person‘s holding that attitude.‖
81
  Fiducial faith represents one way that 
the world might be.  Beliefs, on the other hand, purport to describe what is actually the 
case.  As such, we hold beliefs to a higher standard.   
 Finally, Audi writes,  
Rational faith implies that one may not have good reasons for believing an obviously 
incompatible proposition—unless those counterreasons [sic] are ultimately defeated—
but rational faith still requires a lesser degree of positive grounding than does rational 
belief.  Rational faith is epistemically less at risk
82
, in the sense that it is less easily 
                                                 
77
 Audi, 1992, p65 
78
 We do talk about ―rationalizing‖ beliefs, but this is typically synonymous with justifying 
beliefs. 
79
 In an interesting passage (Audi, 1991), Audi uses this distinction between rationality and 
justification to differentiate between two ways of reconciling faith and reason.  The first, the 
internal, is analogous to rationality.  The second, the external, is analogous to justification. 
80
 Audi, 1991, p221 
81
 Audi, 1996, p98 
82
 Audi also writes that faith is an attitude that ―is not simply a response to evidence, where that is 
taken to be above all formation of a cognitive attitude having a content and strength appropriate 
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defeated, than rational belief.  This point should not be exaggerated, however: the 
rationality of faith is still vulnerable to undermining evidence and typically implies an 
openness to dealing in some way with purported counterevidence.  This openness and 
its often attendant sense of the possibility of error, is in part why having faith is 
sometimes associated with taking a risk."
83
 
 
This is one of the more important implications of nondoxastic faith.  Even if religious 
beliefs are irrational/unjustified, it still may be the case that religious faith is 
rational/justified.  It may turn out that religious belief is ultimately irrational.  What 
nondoxastic approaches to faith demonstrate, however, is that this does not imply that 
religious faith is irrational.  This is particularly important for individuals concerned about 
the rationality of their faith: a nondoxastic approach may offer a suitable replacement for 
belief.
                                                                                                                                                 
to the nature and amount of evidence in question‖ (2008, p94).  This surely explains why faith is 
compatible with more doubt than belief and also why faith is less epistemically at risk than belief. 
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Conclusion  
 The chief concern of my project has been to show that faith can be nondoxastic.  
Hope, acceptance, and trust are all attitudes that can serve as a basis for faith (be it sacred 
or secular), and all, for the most part, are nondoxastic attitudes.  Furthermore, I 
considered, in detail, Robert Audi‘s proposal that faith itself can be a nondoxastic 
attitude.  I have suggested (in considering favorably the arguments put forth by Audi) that 
this ―fiducial‖ faith is a particularly useful approach to faith.  It provides us with a rough 
and ready account of secular faith, and provides an intriguing approach to religious faith. 
 My project has also provided a broad survey of nondoxastic attitudes in general 
(from hope and acceptance, to wishing, assuming, and doubting).  These attitudes are an 
inexorable part of our cognitive lives, though we tend to focus on belief.   
 In conclusion, I have shown that nondoxastic approaches to faith are not only 
viable, but also offer important advantages over doxastic approaches.
84
  For one, a 
nondoxastic approach to faith eases the tension between faith and merit.  The cognitive 
commitment required for nondoxastic faith heightens the volitional aspect of faith.  Thus, 
nondoxastic faith can be meritorious in ways that doxastic faith seemingly cannot.  One 
question that remains is the exact extent to which nondoxastic faith is voluntary. 
 Another benefit of a nondoxastic approach is its epistemic dimension.  The 
tension between faith and reason is lessened in nondoxastic faith.  It is possible for 
nondoxastic attitudes to be rational, even if their doxastic counterparts are not.  Hope that 
a friend will recover from a serious illness is generally rational, even if such a belief 
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might not be.  More importantly, religious nondoxastic faith may be rational even if 
religious belief is not.   
Finally, an important benefit of fiducial faith (over hope and acceptance) is that it 
captures an important attitudinal component of faith.  Faith is an evaluative attitude.  It 
entails a positive outlook towards the object of faith.  People who have faith that God 
exists, or even faith that a friend will recover from illness, place some value on these 
things.  Other approaches fail to capture this important point of faith.  
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